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Abstract
The paper looks at the link between inequality and voter turnout, and derives three hypothesis from previous 
literature. It is shown that inequality associates negatively with turnout at the national elections (hypothesis 1). 
Although this is not a very strong effect, but it is net of several factors affecting voter turnout that are empirically 
well proven – such as individual characteristics or different features of the political system. The literature suggests 
that this negative association is either due to the lower turnout of the poor relative to the rich in high inequality 
countries (hypothesis 2) or due to the effects of the universal welfare state, which increases turnout through altered 
social norms as well as decreases inequality through government intervention (hypothesis 3). Although none of 
the hypotheses were refuted, neither was really supported by the data. I also tested whether inequalities at the top 
or at the bottom have a different affect on turnout. Although the results, again, are not very robust, it seems that 
larger differences in income between the very rich and the middle decreases overall turnout, while higher differ-
ence between the middle and the very poor increases turnout. This is just the opposite of what is expected from the 
Downsian rational voter model.
JEL codes: D72, D63Page • 8
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While effects of individual resources and institutional characteristics on political participation have long been 
established, there is no knowledge of the effect of inequality on political participation. In particular, does an in-
crease in inequality mobilize or de-mobilize citizens to participate in politics? We know only a little how societal 
environment affects voter political participation. Inequality, for instance, can have an impact through changing 
social norms (Lister 2007), through altered political agenda (Solt 2010; Mueller and Stratmann 2003) or through 
other chanels (Paczynska 2005). It is thus likely that in societies with greater income inequalities, we should ob-
serve polarization of participation modes, where higher inequality will be associated with a larger divergence of 
participation. This paper looks only at one of these modes of political participation: voter turnout. Although voting 
can be seen as the least unequal type of participation, it is still far from being unbiased (Lijphart 1997). We know 
that voting is strongly conditioned on socio-economic position (Geys 2006b; Lijphart 1997; Blais 2006; Gallego 
2007), on civic resources (Verba et al 1995), and also on country level factors (Geys 2006b, 2006a; Blais 2006). 
But we know less about the link between inequality and voter turnout. This paper will look at this link, and specu-
late about the possible reasons why inequality might influence voter turnout.
In the following, I first review the current literature on the link between inequality and voter turnout, and 
derive some hypotheses from these. The next section introduces the European Election Survey (EES) data which 
is used to test the hypotheses, and executes the tests. The third section speculates about the results, while the last 
section concludes.Page • 10
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1.  Voter turnout and inequality
Voter turnout has been low and steadily declining, especially in the developed countries, throughout the last 
decades (e.g. Lijphart 1997). The average European voter turnout was around 85% up until the mid-80’s, and 
has dropped a massive 10-15 percentage points ever since. This drop is partly due to the introduction of the ten 
Central-Eastern European (CEE) countries into the European community, but can also be observed within the 
Western-European states, although to a smaller extent, as well as within the CEE part of Europe (see 1. figure 
below and 10. figure in the appendix).




Similarly, income inequalities have grown during the last couple of decades. This trend is 
observable in more than two-thirds of the OECD countries, independent of the utilized 
measure (OECD 2008). Income inequalities tend to fluctuate much less than voter turnout 
(see 2. figure below and 11. figure in the appendix). Also, it is questioned whether the observed 
variance of the indicators of inequality are due to the actual variance of social inequalities or 
rather due to measurement bias. 
Nevertheless, both voter turnout and measures of income inequality vary considerably 
between countries. The argument that we should only observe income measures to change 
very little or very slowly would question the adequacy of time series models (unless data for a 
long period were available). But variance between countries offers the possibility to identify 





































































































Similarly, income inequalities have grown during the last couple of decades. This trend is observable in more 
than two-thirds of the OECD countries, independent of the utilized measure (OECD 2008). Income inequali-
ties tend to fluctuate much less than voter turnout (see 2. figure below and 11. figure in the appendix). Also, it is 
questioned whether the observed variance of the indicators of inequality are due to the actual variance of social 
inequalities or rather due to measurement bias.Page • 12
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Nevertheless, both voter turnout and measures of income inequality vary considerably between countries. The 
argument that we should only observe income measures to change very little or very slowly would question the 
adequacy of time series models (unless data for a long period were available). But variance between countries of-
fers the possibility to identify the relation between inequality and voter turnout using cross-country models.





In order to minimize measurement bias, I use several indicators of inequality (see 2. table in 
the appendix). Beside the Eurostat’s income Gini coefficient I use a Gini of earnings (SSO 
2009), an s80/s20 ratio (SSO 2009), the mean distance from the median indicator of Lancee 
and van de Werfhorst (2011), a poverty rate from the Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (SILC) database and two p95/p5 measures, one from the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) (Tóth and Keller 2011) and one from the SILC database. These all indicate overall 
income inequalities. I also look at inequalities above and below the median. I use the above 
and below the median MDMI indices (Lancee and van de Werfhorst 2011) and the p95/p50 
and p50/p5 figures from the LIS and from the SILC databases (see 3. table in the appendix). 
3. figure below shows the association between voter turnout and different measures of income 
inequalities. Apparently, the association is not very strong, and negative – if any.  
This mild association is unsurprising if we consider that voter turnout is directly influenced 
by many factors, mostly unrelated to inequalities. Below I summarize the main driving forces 












































In order to minimize measurement bias, I use several indicators of inequality (see 2. table in the appendix). 
Beside the Eurostat’s income Gini coefficient I use a Gini of earnings (SSO 2009), an s80/s20 ratio (SSO 2009), the 
mean distance from the median indicator of Lancee and van de Werfhorst (2011), a poverty rate from the Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) database and two p95/p5 measures, one from the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) (Tóth and Keller 2011) and one from the SILC database. These all indicate overall income inequali-
ties. I also look at inequalities above and below the median. I use the above and below the median MDMI indices 
(Lancee and van de Werfhorst 2011) and the p95/p50 and p50/p5 figures from the LIS and from the SILC databases 
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3. figure below shows the association between voter turnout and different measures of income inequalities. 
Apparently, the association is not very strong, and negative – if any. 
This mild association is unsurprising if we consider that voter turnout is directly influenced by many factors, 
mostly unrelated to inequalities. Below I summarize the main driving forces of voter turnout and also present some 
hypotheses about the relation of inequality and turnout.





The most often used model to predict individual voter turnout is the Downsian rational voter 
model (Downs 1957). The model states that people decide whether they will vote or not based 
on an expected utility. The expected utility is the benefit from their choice (party) being the 
winner versus the disutility of another party being elected, multiplied by the probability of 
their vote being decisive and the costs of voting subtracted from this. The paradox of (not) 
voting is thus the fact that this “equation” is likely to be negative if many people vote (since 
the probability of a vote being decisive is almost nil, while the costs of voting is likely to be 
greater than zero), but if few people vote the expected utility is certainly positive (since the 
probability of a vote being decisive is great). Many resolutions for this paradox have been 
developed (see Geys 2006b for a comprehensive review). The addition of consumption 
benefit (Riker and Ordeshook 1968), taking ethical or altruistic preferences into account 
(Goodin and Roberts 1975), the minimax regret strategy (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974) or game 
theoretical approaches (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1983, 1985; Ledyard 1984) have all tried to 
address the paradox of voting. Indeed, the “pure” Downsian model of voting addresses the 
questions of marginal changes (why a middling person might vote) much better than the 
aggregate level of turnout (how many people vote) (Geys 2006b, p18). 
Although using the Downsian framework it is hard to explain aggregate levels of turnout, 
there are several, empirically well documented factors that increase or decrease one’s 
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The most often used model to predict individual voter turnout is the Downsian rational voter model (Downs 
1957). The model states that people decide whether they will vote or not based on an expected utility. The expected 
utility is the benefit from their choice (party) being the winner versus the disutility of another party being elected, 
multiplied by the probability of their vote being decisive and the costs of voting subtracted from this. The paradox 
of (not) voting is thus the fact that this “equation” is likely to be negative if many people vote (since the prob-
ability of a vote being decisive is almost nil, while the costs of voting is likely to be greater than zero), but if few 
people vote the expected utility is certainly positive (since the probability of a vote being decisive is great). Many 
resolutions for this paradox have been developed (see Geys 2006b for a comprehensive review). The addition of 
consumption benefit (Riker and Ordeshook 1968), taking ethical or altruistic preferences into account (Goodin Page • 14
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and Roberts 1975), the minimax regret strategy (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974) or game theoretical approaches (Pal-
frey and Rosenthal 1983, 1985; Ledyard 1984) have all tried to address the paradox of voting. Indeed, the “pure” 
Downsian model of voting addresses the questions of marginal changes (why a middling person might vote) much 
better than the aggregate level of turnout (how many people vote) (Geys 2006b, p18).
Although using the Downsian framework it is hard to explain aggregate levels of turnout, there are several, 
empirically well documented factors that increase or decrease one’s probability to cast a vote. Individual character-
istics certainly matter: richer, more affluent people are much more likely to vote, just as higher education leads to 
a higher probability of voting (Lijphart 1997). The literature, understandably, is more occupied with country level 
factors that affect turnout. For instance Blais (2006) and Geys (2006a) both provide comprehensive reviews about 
these factors. Geys (2006a) clusters country level factors into three groups: socio-economic, political and insti-
tutional variables. Examples of socio-economic factors are population size, population concentration, population 
stability, population homogeneity or previous turnout level. Political variables can be the closeness (or marginal-
ity) of an election (i.e. how close the outcome of the election is), campaign expenditures, or political fragmenta-
tion. Institutional variables are the electoral system (majority, proportional representation or plurality voting), 
compulsory voting, concurrent elections, registration requirements… etc. Geys (2006a) in his review concludes 
that little agreement has been reached with many of the above factors. Institutional factors are the most consensual: 
compulsory voting, easier registration procedures, concurrent elections and proportional representation all foster 
higher turnout. Population size and electoral closeness also seem to be affecting turnout in general, although sev-
eral of the analyzed papers had not found any link between them.
The review also notes that population heterogeneity (homogeneous groups within the society) seem to have no 
effect on turnout, although theoretically “as cohesion increases group solidarity (and ‘social pressure’), political 
participation in communities with high degree of socio-economic, racial or ethnic homogeneity should be higher 
than in areas where this is not the case” (Geys 2006a p.644-645, emphasis in original). The question similar to pop-
ulation heterogeneity is in the focus of this paper as well, so this no-relationship finding is discouraging. However, 
the reviewed papers are mostly using a Herfindahl-Hirschmann concentration index to proxy heterogeneity, which 
is quite distant from the measures of inequality (used by this paper). Moreover, there are convincing new studies 
(e.g. Kaniovski and Mueller 2006; Yamamura 2009; Funk 2008) that argue that more heterogeneous communities Page • 15
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are less likely to vote, in line with the expectations of the group-based model (see Uhlaner 1989; Grossman and 
Helpman 2002; Filer, Kenny, and Morton 1993).
There are some studies that directly test the association of inequality and voter turnout. The most compre-
hensive study is Solt’s (2010) testing the Schattschneider hypothesis (Schattschneider 1960). In his book, Schatt-
schneider wrote that large economic inequalities lead to low participation rates as well as a high income bias in 
participation. “As the rich grow richer relative to their fellow citizens […] they consequently grow better able 
define the alternatives that are considered within the political system and exclude matters of importance to poor 
citizens” (Solt 2010 p.285) Hence poor will less likely to cast a vote, as inequality goes up, since their expected 
benefit from voting declines. Solt (2010) uses American gubernatorial elections data to test the association be-
tween turnout and inequality. He uses state level Gini coefficient calculated for three years (1980, 1990, 2000) to 
proxy income inequality, while voter turnout is also for these years. Solt shows that income inequality associates 
negatively with electoral participation, while higher income people tend to vote relatively more as inequality rises.
A similar conclusion is presented by Mueller ad Stratmann (2003), but with a different theoretical approach. 
They argue that if upper classes have higher participation rates than lower classes, and upper classes favor right 
of center parties, lower classes left of center parties, and right of center parties adopt policies that benefit the up-
per classes, while left of center parties adopt policies that favor the lower classes, then lower participation rates 
will lead to higher income inequalities. Hence their conclusion: voter turnout associates negatively with income 
inequality, but it is the decreasing participation rate that drives inequalities and not vice-versa. That is, their result 
is the same, but the line of argument is different from that of Schattschneider (1960). The Muller and Stratmann 
(2003) argument fits the Meltzer and Richard (1981) logic, namely that “when the mean income rises relative to 
the income of the decisive voter, taxes rise, and vice versa.” If fewer people vote, then relatively more rich people 
vote, so median voter income will be larger (with mean income unchanged), which decreases taxes (preferences 
for redistribution is smaller). 
One might also argue oppositely. Based on the Meltzer and Richard (1981) logic, if government decides only 
about the size of redistribution, then voter turnout should relatively be low if inequality is low, and turnout be high 
if inequality is high. When inequality is low, then poor people have little to gain, and rich little to lose if govern-
ment redistributes, so why would they vote? Similarly if inequality is high, then poor have a lot to gain, and rich Page • 16
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have a lot to lose from redistribution, hence they will vote. This, of course, is an overly simplified argument not 
taking into account several other incentives driving one to vote.
While both Solt (2010) and Muller and Stratmann (2003) base the negative association of inequality and voter 
turnout on differences in participation rates between people with different incomes, Lister (2007) uses differences 
in social norms between countries to explain the negative association. He argues that the missing link (omitted 
variable) between inequality and turnout is institutions. Institutions affect social norms, which affect individual 
behavior. Universalist welfare states encourage solidarity and participation, and thus foster higher voter turnout 
than other types of welfare states. Nevertheless, his argument also leads to a negative relation between inequality 
and turnout: universal welfare states tend to have lower income inequalities and higher turnout. 
The Downsian median voter logic, on the other hand, might lead one to argue in a different way. Growing 
inequalities might increase the probability of the lower income/ lower class people to influence politics more, if 
they can coalesce with the middle. In other words, if rising inequalities are due to rising income on the top, then 
the redistributive preferences of middle will be closer to the bottom than to the top; thus the middle might unite 
with the lower income/lower classes to “conquer” the upper classes. This would mean that higher inequality on the 
top would lead to a relatively higher turnout for the lower class/lower income. On the other hand, if rising income 
is due to a relatively decreasing income for the poor (as compared to the middle), then the coalition of the middle 
with the upper classes seem theoretically more likely (Lupu and Pontusson 2011). Hence, when looking at the rela-
tion between inequality and turnout one has to look not only at measures of general income inequality but also at 
differences between the bottom and the middle and the top.
1.1.  Hypotheses
From the above literature I derive three separate hypotheses for testing:
1.  Inequality associates negatively with voter turnout, ceteris paribus the other factors that are shown to 
influence turnout.
2.  The reason for this negative association is that
a.  turnout for lower income people tend to be relatively smaller, when overall inequality is high 
(i.e. if inequality is high poor people tend to vote less, while rich tend to vote more, but this latter 
does not counterbalance the drop of “poor-votes”), or alternatively
b.  turnout for lower income people tend to be relatively smaller if inequality at the bottom is high, 
but turnout for lower income tend to be relatively higher if inequality on the top is high.
or
3.  Universal welfare states have higher turnout as well as lower income inequality.Page • 17
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2.  Data and method
I use the 2009 PIREDEU European Election Study (EES 2010; van Egmond et al. 2010) to test the associa-
tion between inequality and turnout. The study was conducted right after the 2009 European parliamentary elec-
tions with the aim to research the EU elections. The main advantage of these surveys is that they contain all 27 
European countries, with approximately 1000 responses from each. Besides the turnout measure it also contains 
a modest background questionnaire about individual characteristics, including education, gender and a subjective 
income measure (see below). The EES also provides substantial amount of data about the institutional system. The 
EES data was collected at one point in time in each country, thus the time since the last national election varies 
across countries, as a consequence the responses about actual turnout will also be differently overstated (people 
remember harder to an earlier election). 1. table below shows the participating countries and their aggregate voter 
turnout. The right column shows the actual turnout at the 2009 national elections. Unfortunately, the questionnaire 
did not have a question about actual turnout, but rather asked about the party vote. Nevertheless this question had 
the option “did not cast a vote” but many have refused to answer (e.g. in Italy, where voting is compulsory more 
than 26% of the voters did not answer), and also many had not remembered the action (e.g. in Latvia almost 20% 
did not know the answer). Nevertheless, I relied on those, who had definite answer; hence the turnout measure is 
those who voted over those who voted plus those who did not vote (reported figure column). Since surveys tend to 
overestimate the actual voter turnout – and as can be seen, differences between the reported and the official figures 
are sometimes substantial (e.g. Slovakia or Romania) – I used the ratio of the 2009 official/reported voter turnout 
ratio as weights in the estimations below.Page • 18
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1. table – Voter turnout, actual and observed
2009 refuseD to aNswer Not VoteD VoteD Not elIGIble DoN't kNow rePorteD 
fIGure*
offIcIal fIGure
austrIa 13,60 2,90 77,60 1,30 4,60 0,96 0,79
belGIum 17,47 4,79 68,86 1,90 6,99 0,93 0,91
bulGarIa 10,60 19,80 56,80 2,20 10,60 0,74 0,56
cyPrus 9,00 4,50 78,70 2,80 5,00 0,95 0,89
cZech rePublIc 5,59 21,67 65,49 2,55 4,71 0,75 0,64
DeNmark 1,10 3,40 92,50 1,00 2,00 0,96 0,87
estoNIa 3,57 19,86 64,15 2,48 9,93 0,76 0,62
fINlaND 4,80 8,10 76,40 1,80 8,90 0,90 0,65
fraNce 16,40 7,70 61,70 3,50 10,70 0,89 0,60
GermaNy 12,75 5,48 71,41 3,39 6,97 0,93 0,78
Greece 5,60 6,10 84,50 2,20 1,60 0,93 0,87
huNGary 11,24 14,53 69,75 1,19 3,28 0,83 0,68
IrelaND 5,39 6,79 74,53 3,50 9,79 0,92 0,67
Italy 26,30 5,80 57,60 1,00 9,30 0,91 0,78
latVIa 3,20 15,08 58,14 4,40 19,18 0,79 0,62
lIthuaNIa 6,90 23,40 58,10 1,90 9,70 0,71 0,49
luxembourG 8,29 9,69 62,64 8,19 11,19 0,87 0,92
malta 30,90 2,50 60,80 2,00 3,80 0,96 0,93
NetherlaNDs 3,18 5,57 86,17 1,49 3,58 0,94 0,80
PolaND 4,29 22,65 62,97 2,20 7,88 0,74 0,54
PortuGal 14,60 8,80 65,00 4,40 7,20 0,88 0,64
romaNIa 7,78 18,64 64,61 0,50 8,47 0,78 0,39
sloVakIa 6,50 14,86 69,78 2,46 6,40 0,82 0,55
sloVeNIa 8,30 7,60 76,60 0,80 6,70 0,91 0,63
sPaIN 10,90 8,30 76,80 1,60 2,40 0,90 0,74
sweDeN 3,29 2,00 88,22 2,50 3,99 0,98 0,82
uk 6,80 11,60 73,40 3,50 4,70 0,86 0,62
meAn 9,56 10,46 70,49 2,47 7,02 0,87 0,74
*voted/(voted+ not voted)
source: European Election Study/Piredeu 2009.
The EES data allows for numerous individual controls. The base model (see 6. table in the appendix) includes 
individual level controls as well as country level controls. The individual controls are age, age squared, gender, 
age when the respondent finished education and a within country standardized “subjective standard of living”.1 
Country level controls are compulsory voting, multiple election at the same time, size of population, existence of a 
threshold for a party to get in the parliament, electoral system (from proportional (0) to plurality (5)), presidential 
system, federalism,  time since last national election (years), percentage of other nationalities, GDP as percentage 
1  The question for the subjective standard of living was: „Taking everything into account, at about what level is your family’s standard of 
living? If you think of a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means a poor family, 7 a rich family, and the other numbers are for the positions in 
between, about where would you place your family?” Since the country mean for this question tend to correlate with income inequalities 
I standardized the answers within country (0 mean, 1 sd).Page • 19
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of mean EU 27. See all variables in the appendix 4. table and 5. table. I use all of these variables as controls in each 
of the estimations below.
I will use three types of models to test the association between inequality and voter turnout. A simple logit 
regression (1) with country clustered standard errors will be the base, a 2 step estimation (2) and a hierarchical 
model (3) will provide robustness checks for the logit model.
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I will use three types of models to test the association between inequality and voter turnout. A 
simple logit regression (1) with country clustered standard errors will be the base, a 2 step 
estimation  (2)  and  a hierarchical model  (3) will provide robustness checks for the logit 
model. 
The logit model will be the following: 
(1)                                       
where V is the dummy for voting, Y is a factor of individual characteristics, while Z represents country level 
features including a measure of income inequality; i is an index for individual and c for country.       are 
parameters to be estimated, while   is an idiosyncratic error term.  
Pooled-sample estimation with binary dependent variables struggle with stochastic specifications that differ 
across levels. In these cases Franzese (2005) suggests the researcher to consider the use of a 2 step estimation. In 
the 2 step estimation  process  I estimate a predicted probability for each respondent within each country 
separately in the 1
st step, then I use the country means as the dependent variable in the 2
nd step. That is, I 
estimate the 
(2a)                               
equation, and predict the probability of voting for a 40-year-old male voter, who went to school until age of 18, 
with mean standard of living. In order to correct for the different efficiency of the first step estimates I use the 
inverse standard deviation of the predicted probabilities as weight in the second step.  
(2b)                        
where PrVote is the predicted country mean of voting. The theoretical difference between this approach and the 
logit model is that the 2 step estimation allows for different effects of the individual characteristics within 
countries, i.e. the 2 step is a more flexible model compared to the logit. 
Finally, I estimate a hierarchical model, where respondents are nested in countries: 
                                                        
1 The question for the subjective standard of living was: „Taking everything into account, at about what 
level is your family’s standard of living? If you think of a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means a poor family, 7 
a rich family, and the other numbers are for the positions in between, about where would you place your 
family?” Since the country mean for this question tend to correlate with income inequalities I standardized 
the answers within country (0 mean, 1 sd). 
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tries, i.e. the 2 step is a more flexible model compared to the logit.
Finally, I estimate a hierarchical model, where respondents are nested in countries:
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(3)                                         
where u is a country level error term.  
A big handicap of the 2 step estimation procedure is that it cannot handle interaction effects between individual 
and country level variables (by definition), and also that by predicting country means, I pre-define a group of 
people, whose turnout will be the dependent variable in the second step. When testing hypotheses 2 I have to use 
interaction terms: how the country level inequality affects the association between income and voter turnout. 
Within hierarchical models, as well as within simple logit models, the interaction can easily be done. 2 step 
estimation, on the other hand, has its advantage as well. The results from the 2
nd step can easily be depicted (see 
below), unlike the estimates of the logit or the hierarchical estimates. 
Results 
Declining turnout – hypothesis 1 
The point estimates of the individual controls in the base model (6. table) are all as expected. 
Age associates with higher turnout but at a declining rate, years spent in school education 
also increases turnout, richer tend to vote more, and women are just as likely to vote as men, 
if all above socio-economic characteristics are controlled for. From the country level features 
fewer factors are significant. The existence of a threshold decreases turnout, and presidential 
systems also have fewer people to cast a vote, while federalist states have a higher turnout. 
Nevertheless, since these country level characteristics are not in the focus of the paper, I leave 
them in the models as controls, even if they do not significantly associate with turnout. 
 
Tests for hypothesis 1 are in 7. table (logit), 8. table (2 step), and 9. table (hierarchical) in 
the appendix.  All  estimation procedures seem to provide the same results. Except the 
Eurostat Gini variable, and the s80/s20 ratio all income measures associate negatively with 
voter turnout, but very few are significant. Only the poverty rate shows significant association 
with the turnout across estimations, while the MDMI and the earnings Gini coefficients are 
also weakly (10% or less) significant in all models. The other four proxies (income Gini, 
s80/s20 and the two p95/p5 ratios) are all insignificantly related to voter turnout. 
However, if I consider that the models have taken into account several known influences of 
turnout, and that the number of countries are not very high I should conclude that these 
results are in line with the 1st hypothesis. It seems that inequality associates negatively with 
voter turnout, if we control for other factors which are claimed to influence turnout. 
4. figure below depicts this association using the predicted probabilities from the 1st step of 
the 2 step procedure. It is apparent that the association between inequality and predicted 
voter turnout is not very strong, but negative. Especially the poverty rate associates closely 
with turnout, but all other indicators show a negative rather than a positive relation. 
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A big handicap of the 2 step estimation procedure is that it cannot handle interaction effects between individual and 
country level variables (by definition), and also that by predicting country means, I pre-define a group of people, 
whose turnout will be the dependent variable in the second step. When testing hypotheses 2 I have to use inter-
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the other hand, has its advantage as well. The results from the 2nd step can easily be depicted (see below), unlike 
the estimates of the logit or the hierarchical estimates.Page • 21
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3.  results
3.1.  Declining turnout – hypothesis 1
The point estimates of the individual controls in the base model (6. table) are all as expected. Age associates 
with higher turnout but at a declining rate, years spent in school education also increases turnout, richer tend to 
vote more, and women are just as likely to vote as men, if all above socio-economic characteristics are controlled 
for. From the country level features fewer factors are significant. The existence of a threshold decreases turnout, 
and presidential systems also have fewer people to cast a vote, while federalist states have a higher turnout. Nev-
ertheless, since these country level characteristics are not in the focus of the paper, I leave them in the models as 
controls, even if they do not significantly associate with turnout.
Tests for hypothesis 1 are in 7. table (logit), 8. table (2 step), and 9. table (hierarchical) in the appendix. All 
estimation procedures seem to provide the same results. Except the Eurostat Gini variable, and the s80/s20 ratio all 
income measures associate negatively with voter turnout, but very few are significant. Only the poverty rate shows 
significant association with the turnout across estimations, while the MDMI and the earnings Gini coefficients are 
also weakly (10% or less) significant in all models. The other four proxies (income Gini, s80/s20 and the two 
p95/p5 ratios) are all insignificantly related to voter turnout.
However, if I consider that the models have taken into account several known influences of turnout, and that 
the number of countries are not very high I should conclude that these results are in line with the 1st hypothesis. 
It seems that inequality associates negatively with voter turnout, if we control for other factors which are claimed 
to influence turnout.
4. figure below depicts this association using the predicted probabilities from the 1st step of the 2 step pro-
cedure. It is apparent that the association between inequality and predicted voter turnout is not very strong, but 
negative. Especially the poverty rate associates closely with turnout, but all other indicators show a negative rather 
than a positive relation.
Nonetheless, the reason for this negative association is not straightforward. The hypotheses above could allow 
for three different reasons: a) turnout for the poor declines as inequality goes up, b) turnout for the rich declines 
as inequality goes up or c) there is no change in the relative turnout of the different income people but universal 
welfare states drive the results.Page • 22
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note: predicted probabilities are for a 40 year old man with average income, who finished education at age 18 
Income	bias	–	hypothesis	2a	
Unfortunately the EES dataset does not contain an absolute measure of income or class. The 
income measure in the dataset is a subjective standard of living. The respondents place 
themselves within seven categories as compared to others in the society, and thus are 
endogenous with the inequality measures (e.g. the greater the inequality, the more people are 
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note: predicted probabilities are for a 40 year old man with average income, who finished education at age 18
3.2.  Income bias – hypothesis 2a
Unfortunately the EES dataset does not contain an absolute measure of income or class. The income measure 
in the dataset is a subjective standard of living. The respondents place themselves within seven categories as com-
pared to others in the society, and thus are endogenous with the inequality measures (e.g. the greater the inequality, 
the more people are likely to consider themselves poor). For this reason the interaction between the subjective 
standard of living and the inequality measure might be biased. The higher the inequality the more people tend to 
be poor (because it is a subjective / self evaluated measure). So a person, with similar probability of voting might 
consider herself poor in one country with high inequality and not poor in a country with low inequality. And vice-
versa a person might consider herself rich in a low inequality country while not rich in a high inequality country, 
assuming identical turnout probabilities. Hence the effect of the interaction of income with inequality on turnout 
could be biased. Unfortunately the direction of the bias is also not clear. It depends on our assumption of inequal-
ity on the subjective evaluation of income. If average income people tend to “de-valuate” their income more in an 
unequal country than rich people, then the effect of income on voter turnout will be downwardly biased. But if rich Page • 23
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tend to look at themselves as lesser rich in an unequal country as compared to the subjective income “decline” of 
an average income person, then income effect on voting will be upwardly biased. So the direction of bias of subjec-
tive income on turnout will depend on the relative evaluation of income across income groups.
I could not find any suitable instrument that could solve this problem. I would need a variable that explains 
why one might consider herself poorer meanwhile being uncorrelated with voter turnout and only unconditionally 
correlated with inequality. Hence, the estimates of the interaction effect of lower income and inequality on turnout 
might be biased. In order to minimize bias I standardized the income proxy (subjective standard of living) within 
countries. By this, the cross-country correlation of the standardized income and the inequality measure will be 
zero, by definition. However, we do not rule out the fact that there will be more relatively poor people in higher 
income countries. Nevertheless, I believe that the size of this bias will be small (see argument about the direction 
of the bias), and thus only marginally affecting the substantial results. 
The lack of absolute income could also be a problem if we assume that absolute income matters as well as 
relative income (see Solt 2010). Within the Downsian framework, the lack of absolute income might not be a 
problem, if we disregard the “hard” costs of voting: people vote more likely when the probability of their vote be-
ing decisive goes up; hence their relative position within the society matters. However, if we assume that absolute 
income matters as well – poorer people have troubles paying the costs of voting, e.g. traveling to the voting booth 
is costly – the point estimates will be biased, due to an omitted variable bias. Although I must make the assump-
tion that absolute costs does not matter, I believe that in developed countries casting a vote is not very expensive.
10. table and 11. table in the appendix shows that the subjective standard of living does not associate sig-
nificantly with voter turnout through increased inequality: richer people are not more likely to vote as inequality 
goes up. None of the interaction effects are significant, moreover their signs are also not consistently negative or 
positive. 
Another way of looking at this income bias is to use the marginal effect if the subjective income on turnout 
from the 1st step estimation. 5. figure depicts the association of this marginal effect (estimated for the same 40 
year old male schooled until age 18) with the different inequality measures. Apparently the same conclusion can 
be drawn: we cannot straightforwardly conclude that higher income people tend to vote more in more unequal 
countries.Page • 24
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3.3.  Inequality on the top and at the bottom – hypothesis 2b
12. table below shows the association between income inequality on the top and at the bottom with voter 
turnout. Results are not very robust, mainly due to the fact that the general indicators of inequality (MDMI and 
p95/p5), which can be separated along income distribution, are themselves poor explanators of turnout. Thus we 
see no strong association between inequality on the top and inequality at the bottom with voter turnout. However, 
the point estimates, as well as mild significance of the p95/p50 indicators and the p50/p5 LIS measure shows that 
higher inequality at the top associates with lower turnout, while higher inequality at the bottom goes together with 
higher turnout (or rather no association at all at the bottom). That is, the higher the difference between the very rich 
and the middle decreases overall turnout, while higher difference between the middle and the very poor does not 
change (or mildly increases) turnout. 13. table shows no indication of income effects at all. So the relative turnout 
of the rich and the poor, as shown by the interaction terms, does not change when inequality changes on the top or 
at the bottom. Although the point estimates are insignificant, they are against hypothesis 2b. i.e. richer people tend 
to vote more if inequality on the top is higher, while poorer tend to vote more if inequality at the bottom is higher. Page • 25
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This is just the opposite of what hypothesis 2b has assumed. These effects, however, are all insignificant, 
which might be due to the small number of countries, as well as the relatively unimportant effect of inequality.
This is also what we see in 6. figure below: the different measures of income inequality on the top and at the 
bottom associate mildly with the predicted probability of voter turnout. Inequality on the top tend to go weakly and 
negatively together with turnout, while inequality at the bottom has no relation with turnout.
6. figure - Association of inequality on the top and at the bottom with turnout – predicted probabilities from the 1st 







Although Lister (2007) uses the Gini coefficient to proxy universal welfare states – arguing 
that the lower the inequality the higher the state intervention is – for the purposes of this 
paper this proxy would obviously not be useful. Therefore, in order to test hypothesis 3, I 
have to use alternative measures of the welfare state. I will utilize government spending as 
percentage of GDP and government spending on social protection as percentage of GDP. 
Both are similar, but widely used measures for the size of state interventions, and thus for the 
welfare state (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990). I assume that the larger the spending, the more 
universal the welfare state is. 7.	figure and 8.	figure below shows that government spending 
associates negatively with inequalities (the higher the spending the lower the inequalities), as 
expected, and it also associates positively with voter turnout (8.	figure and 9.	figure). Thus 
Lister’s (2007) argument could hold: we have observed that inequality associates negatively 
with turnout, and also that inequality associates negatively with the welfare state, which 
associates positively with turnout. Hence the link between inequality and turnout could 
indeed be driven by the welfare state. If universal welfare states are indeed an omitted 
variable, we should see the unbiased effect of income inequality on voter turnout after 
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3.4.  universal welfare states – hypothesis 3
Although Lister (2007) uses the Gini coefficient to proxy universal welfare states – arguing that the lower the 
inequality the higher the state intervention is – for the purposes of this paper this proxy would obviously not be 
useful. Therefore, in order to test hypothesis 3, I have to use alternative measures of the welfare state. I will utilize 
government spending as percentage of GDP and government spending on social protection as percentage of GDP. 
Both are similar, but widely used measures for the size of state interventions, and thus for the welfare state (e.g. 
Esping-Andersen 1990). I assume that the larger the spending, the more universal the welfare state is. 7. figure and 
8. figure below shows that government spending associates negatively with inequalities (the higher the spending Page • 26
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the lower the inequalities), as expected, and it also associates positively with voter turnout (8. figure and 9. figure). 
Thus Lister’s (2007) argument could hold: we have observed that inequality associates negatively with turnout, 
and also that inequality associates negatively with the welfare state, which associates positively with turnout. 
Hence the link between inequality and turnout could indeed be driven by the welfare state. If universal welfare 
states are indeed an omitted variable, we should see the unbiased effect of income inequality on voter turnout after 
controlling for government spending.




14.	table and 15.	table shows the logit models, where the government spending and the 
government spending on social protection is included. Since there were no substantial 
differences between the results of the logit, the 2 step and the hierarchical estimations I show 
only the results from the logit regression for the tests of hypothesis 3.2
It is apparent that government spending has a not very strong but positive effect on turnout, 
ceteris paribus individual and other country level factors. If we accept that the size of 
government spending proxies welfare state entrenchment well, we can conclude that 
universal welfare states tend to foster voter turnout. However, the point estimates of the 
different inequality measures did not change significantly after including government 
spending.3 All indicators, but the Gini from the Eurostat, remained negative but lost a bit of 
significance, due probably to increased multicollinearity between the variables. 
From this I conclude that although welfare states tend to have higher voter turnout, it does 
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14. table and 15. table shows the logit models, where the government spending and the government spending 
on social protection is included. Since there were no substantial differences between the results of the logit, the 2 
step and the hierarchical estimations I show only the results from the logit regression for the tests of hypothesis 3.2
It is apparent that government spending has a not very strong but positive effect on turnout, ceteris paribus 
individual and other country level factors. If we accept that the size of government spending proxies welfare state 
entrenchment well, we can conclude that universal welfare states tend to foster voter turnout. However, the point 
estimates of the different inequality measures did not change significantly after including government spending.3 
2  Results from the 2 step and hierarchical estimations were, again, almost identical – and could be requested from the author. 
3  Only the p95/p5, LIS inequality indicator became significant but stayed negative after controlling for government spending on social 
protection (but controlling for the total spending did not have his effect), this is probably due to some outlier or high leverage case. Page • 27
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All indicators, but the Gini from the Eurostat, remained negative but lost a bit of significance, due probably to 
increased multicollinearity between the variables.
From this I conclude that although welfare states tend to have higher voter turnout, it does not seem to be the 
omitted variable that would explain the effect of inequality on turnout.







The paper addressed the issue of the effect of inequality on voter turnout. Using the 2009 
PIREDEU European Election Study dataset I tested three different hypotheses. These 
hypotheses were derived from previous literature. The analyses could show that inequality 
associates negatively with turnout at the national elections (hypothesis 1). This is not a very 
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5 10 15 20 25





















































































.7 .8 .9 1



















































































.7 .8 .9 1
voter turnout, pred. pr.Page • 28
Daniel HornPage • 29
Income inequality and voter turnout 
4.  Conclusion and further comments
The paper addressed the issue of the effect of inequality on voter turnout. Using the 2009 PIREDEU European 
Election Study dataset I tested three different hypotheses. These hypotheses were derived from previous literature. 
The analyses could show that inequality associates negatively with turnout at the national elections (hypothesis 
1). This is not a very strong effect, but it is net of several factors affecting voter turnout that are empirically well 
proven – such as individual characteristics or different features of the political system. The literature suggests 
that this negative association is either due to the lower turnout of the poor relative to the rich in high inequality 
countries (hypothesis 2) or due to the effects of the universal welfare state, which increases turnout through altered 
social norms as well as decreases inequality through government intervention (hypothesis 3). None of these were 
really supported by the data. Although none of the hypotheses were refuted, I did not find significant association 
of the interaction effect of the individual income with inequality – i.e. income associates similarly with turnout in 
different inequality countries. Similarly, it seems that universal welfare states have a higher turnout, but this does 
not influence the association of inequality with turnout. I also tested whether inequalities at the top or at the bottom 
have a different affect on turnout. Although the results, again, are not very robust, it seems that larger differences 
in income between the very rich and the middle decreases overall turnout, while higher difference between the 
middle and the very poor increases turnout. This is just the opposite of what I have expected from the Downsian 
rational voter model.Page • 30
Daniel HornPage • 31
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Appendix
2. table – indicators of overall iunequality



































austrIa 25,7 0,321 3,658 16,8 16,8 4,8 4,4
belGIum 26,4 0,248 3,893 22,6 22,6 4,9 4,5
bulGarIa 33,4 0,331 6,459 61,3 61,3 9,1
cyPrus 28,4 0,315 4,072 25,3 25,3 4,9
cZech rePublIc 25,1 0,264 3,395 19,6 19,6 4,1
DeNmark 27,0 0,256 3,425 17,2 17,2 3,6 3,8
estoNIa 31,4 0,319 4,869 25,9 25,9 7,9 6,1
fINlaND 25,9 0,275 3,709 17,2 17,2 4,2 4,3
fraNce 29,8 18,9 18,9 4,5
GermaNy 29,1 0,330 4,540 18,4 18,4 5,2 5,6
Greece 33,1 0,318 5,370 29,4 29,4 7,1 6,7
huNGary 24,7 0,322 3,557 32,1 32,1 5,8 4,3
IrelaND 28,8 0,334 4,395 25,0 25,0 5,9 5,1
Italy 31,5 0,284 4,887 25,0 25,0 7,4 6,3
latVIa 37,4 0,384 7,058 45,8 45,8 9,5
lIthuaNIa 35,5 0,347 5,658 41,0 41,0 7,0
luxembourG 29,2 0,342 3,904 17,3 17,3 5,0 4,9
malta 37,8 20,6 20,6
NetherlaNDs 27,2 0,309 3,739 16,7 16,7 3,8 4,2
PolaND 31,4 0,348 5,014 45,3 45,3 6,6 6,4
PortuGal 35,4 0,377 6,076 26,1 26,1 7,7
romaNIa 34,9 0,295 6,966 45,9 45,9 10,0
sloVakIa 24,8 0,250 3,309 32,0 32,0 4,0
sloVeNIa 22,7 0,301 3,262 18,5 18,5 4,8 4,1
sPaIN 32,3 0,293 4,926 23,4 23,4 6,9 6,5
sweDeN 24,8 0,305 3,321 14,4 14,4 3,9 3,9
uk 32,4 0,371 5,346 24,8 24,8 6,7 6,6Page • 34
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3. table – indicators of inequality above and below the median
mDmI, aboVe P95/P50, lIs P95/P50, sIlc mDmI, below P50/P5, lIs P50/P5, sIlc


















austrIa 0,47 2,19 2,122 -0,27 2,2 2,054
belGIum 0,55 2,11 2,027 -0,31 2,3 2,215
bulGarIa 2,855                3,174
cyPrus 0,65 2,174 -0,29 2,254
cZech rePublIc 0,51 2,070 -0,22 1,962
DeNmark 0,38 1,78 1,839 -0,24 2,04 2,068
estoNIa 0,71 2,94 2,394 -0,31 2,69 2,557
fINlaND 0,55 1,97 2,035 -0,28 2,12 2,115
fraNce 0,55 2,101 -0,29 2,156
GermaNy 0,58 2,24 2,296 -0,29 2,34 2,436
Greece 0,79 2,56 2,469 -0,36 2,77 2,697
huNGary 0,67 2,44 2,012 -0,31 2,37 2,137
IrelaND 0,84 2,21 2,269 -0,3 2,67 2,255
Italy 0,63 2,53 2,328 -0,34 2,91 2,721
latVIa 2011,01,06 2,945 -0,36 3,215
lIthuaNIa 0,78 2,574 -0,33 2,736
luxembourG 0,64 2,24 2,255 -0,33 2,24 2,163
malta               
NetherlaNDs 0,46 1,89 2,153 -0,24 1,99 1,956
PolaND 0,67 2,49 2,554 -0,35 2,66 2,512
PortuGal 0,95 2,971 -0,34 2,602
romaNIa 2,719                3,661
sloVakIa 0,57 1,926 -0,26 2,086
sloVeNIa 0,43 2,01 1,919 -0,25 2,38 2,129
sPaIN 0,65 2,38 2,340 -0,36 2,9 2,784
sweDeN 0,38 1,89 1,848 -0,27 2,05 2,130
uk 0,72 2,7 2,546 -0,34 2,49 2,595Page • 35
Income inequality and voter turnout 













austrIa 0 0 0 3 3 1
belGIum 0 1 0 3 0 1
bulGarIa 0 0 1 3 3 0
cyPrus 0 1 0 3 1 0
cZech rePublIc 0 0 1 3 0 0
DeNmark 1 0 0 3 0 0
estoNIa 0 0 0 3 0 0
fINlaND 0 0 0 3 0 0
fraNce 0 0 1 1 2 0
GermaNy 0 0 1 4 0 1
Greece 0 1 0 3 0 0
huNGary 0 0 1 4 0 0
IrelaND 0 0 0 5 3 0
Italy 0 0 0 3 0 0
latVIa 0 0 1 3 0 0
lIthuaNIa 0 0 1 2 3 0
luxembourG 1 1 0 3 0 0
malta 0 0 0 5 0 0
NetherlaNDs 0 0 0 3 0 0
PolaND 0 0 1 3 3 0
PortuGal 0 0 0 3 3 0
romaNIa 0 0 0 4 3 0
sloVakIa 0 0 1 3 0 0
sloVeNIa 0 0 0 3 3 0
sPaIN 0 0 0 3 0 0
sweDeN 0 0 1 3 0 0
uk 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: European Election Study/Piredeu 2009Page • 36
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5. table – country level indicators 2





GDP, Per caPIta, % of 
eu 27 (eurostat )
 
GoVerNmeNt exPeNDIture, 
total, % of GDP, 2007
GoVerNmeNt 
exPeNDIture, socIal 
ProtectIoN, % of 
GDP, 2007
austrIa 3,25 8318592 124 48,4 19,9
belGIum 1,00 10666866 116 48,4 17,1
bulGarIa 0,08 7640238 44 41,5 13,1
cyPrus 1,92 789269 98 42,9 9,9
cZech rePublIc 0,92 10381130 82 42,6 12,9
DeNmark 2,42 5475791 121 51 21,7
estoNIa 1,75 1340935 64 34,7 9,6
fINlaND 1,83 5300484 113 47,3 19,9
fraNce 0,30 63982881 108 52,3 22,2
GermaNy 0,42 82217837 116 44,1 20,3
Greece 0,75 11213785 93 44,1 18,7
huNGary 0,83 10045401 65 49,9 17,4
IrelaND 1,92 4401335 127 35,6 10,1
Italy 2,84 59619290 104 47,9 18,2
latVIa 1,33 2270894 52 35,9 8,4
lIthuaNIa 3,00 3366357 55 35 11
luxembourG 0,00 483799 271 36,2 15,3
malta 2,75 410290 81 42,2 13,8
NetherlaNDs 1,00 16405399 131 45,5 16
PolaND 2,42 38115641 61 41,9 15,6
PortuGal 0,42 10617575 80 45,8 17,5
romaNIa 3,42 21528627 46 36,3 9,8
sloVakIa 1,00 5400998 73 34,6 10,6
sloVeNIa 3,34 2010269 88 42,3 15,5
sPaIN 2,75 45283259 103 38,7 13
sweDeN 1,25 9182927 118 52,5 21,6
uk 0,92 61179256 112 44,4 15,3
Source: European Election Study/Piredeu 2009, unless otherwise notedPage • 37
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6. table – Logit Base model (ORs)
  (1)
VarIables Vote=1







aGe wheN fINIsheD eDucatIoN 1.056**
(0.0149)
subjectIVe staNDarD of lIVING
















years from NatIoNal electIoN 1.076
(0.0761)
% of other NatIoNalItIes 0.970+
(0.0173)





Odds ratios, robust clustered se in parentheses, 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1Page • 39
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7. table – Different measures of income inequality on turnout, logit (ORs)
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VarIables Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote
               
subjectIVe staNDarD of lIVING 1.194** 1.186** 1.203** 1.201** 1.198** 1.204** 1.190**
(wIthIN couNtry Z-score) (0.0315) (0.0316) (0.0347) (0.0338) (0.0318) (0.0430) (0.0318)
GINI, eurostat 2009 1.017
(0.0268)
s80/s20, sso 2009 1.041
(0.170)
GINI, earNING, sso 2009 0.982*
(0.00702)
meaN DIstaNce from the meDIaN 0.218+
(0.180)






coNstaNt 0.0852* 0.138+ 0.249 0.181+ 0.251 0.861 0.157+
(0.105) (0.147) (0.215) (0.177) (0.218) (1.581) (0.157)
obserVatIoNs 20,202 18,964 20,202 18,112 20,202 12,979 19,603
Robust seeform in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
8. table – Different measures of income inequality on turnout, 2 step
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VarIables PreDIcteD ProbabIlIya, 2ND steP
               
GINI, eurostat 2009 0.000854
(0.00541)
s80/s20, sso 2009 0.00224
(0.0332)
GINI, earNING, sso 2009 -0.00174
(0.00168)
meaN DIstaNce from the meDIaN -0.338
(0.217)






coNstaNt 0.792** 0.831** 0.864** 0.875** 0.943** 1.024* 0.849**
(0.192) (0.170) (0.137) (0.136) (0.127) (0.376) (0.153)
obserVatIoNs 27 25 27 24 27 17 26
r-squareD 0.575 0.602 0.603 0.648 0.685 0.627 0.587
Standard errors in parentheses, a – for a 40 year old average income men, who finished education at age 18
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1Page • 40
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9. table – Different measures of income inequality on turnout, hierarchical logit (ORs)
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VarIables Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote
GINI, eurostat 2009 1.007
(0.0346)
s80/s20, sso 2009 0.944
(0.165)
GINI, earNING, sso 2009 0.979+
(0.0121)
meaN DIstaNce from the meDIaN 0.0943+
(0.114)






coNstaNt 0.166 0.272 0.380 0.306 0.501 0.986 0.300
(0.207) (0.262) (0.327) (0.273) (0.415) (2.091) (0.265)
raNDom effects Parameters
sD(coNstaNt) 0.529** 0.507** 0.499** 0.474** 0.473** 0.458** 0.499**
(0.0795) (0.0799) (0.0758) (0.0770) (0.0718) (0.0911) (0.0774)
obserVatIoNs 20,202 18,964 20,202 18,112 20,202 19,603 19,603
Number of GrouPs 27 25 27 24 27 26 26
seEform in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1Page • 41
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10. table – Income bias, logit (ORs)
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VarIables Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote
               
subjectIVe staNDarD of lIVING 1.029 0.773 1.011 1.118 1.223* 1.239 1.182
(wIthIN couNtry Z-score) (0.130) (0.122) (0.157) (0.0987) (0.0986) (0.189) (0.186)
GINI, eurostat 2009 1.018
(0.0269)
    * staNDarD of lIVING 1.005
(0.00428)
s80/s20, sso 2009 1.042
(0.170)
    * staNDarD of lIVING 1.006
(0.0188)
GINI, earNING, sso 2009 0.982*
(0.00726)
    * staNDarD of lIVING 0.998
(0.00236)
meaN DIstaNce from the meDIaN 0.222+
(0.184)
    * staNDarD of lIVING 1.155
(0.202)
PoVerty rate, sIlc 0.976+
(0.0129)








    * staNDarD of lIVING 1.001
(0.0125)
coNstaNt 0.0833* 0.137+ 0.251 0.179+ 0.252 0.866 0.156+
(0.103) (0.146) (0.218) (0.175) (0.219) (1.593) (0.158)
obserVatIoNs 20,202 18,964 20,202 18,112 20,202 12,979 19,603
Robust seeform in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1Page • 42
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11. table – income bias, hierarchical logit (ORs)
  (1) (3) (5) (7) (9) (11) (13)
VarIables Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote
               
subjectIVe staNDarD of lIVING
(wIthIN couNtry Z-score) 1.057 0.775 1.046 1.147 1.274** 1.231 1.228**
(0.176) (0.194) (0.207) (0.136) (0.0772) (0.190) (0.0945)
GINI, eurostat 2009 1.008
(0.0346)
    * staNDarD of lIVING 1.005
(0.00545)
s80/s20, sso 2009 0.944
(0.166)
    * staNDarD of lIVING 1.003
(0.0189)
GINI, earNING, sso 2009 0.979+
(0.0121)
    * staNDarD of lIVING 0.998
(0.00316)
meaN DIstaNce from the meDIaN 0.0959+
(0.116)
    * staNDarD of lIVING 1.139
(0.265)
PoVerty rate, sIlc 0.964*
(0.0141)








    * staNDarD of lIVING 0.998
(0.0120)
coNstaNt 0.162 0.271 0.385 0.303 0.505 0.988 0.300
(0.202) (0.261) (0.331) (0.270) (0.418) (2.095) (0.265)
raNDom effects Parameters
0.529** 0.507** 0.499** 0.474** 0.474** 0.458** 0.499**
(0.0795) (0.0799) (0.0758) (0.0769) (0.0719) (0.0911) (0.0774)
obserVatIoNs 20,202 18,964 20,202 18,112 20,202 12,979 19,603
Number of GrouPs 27 25 27 24 27 17 26
seEform in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1Page • 43
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12. table - Different measures of income inequality below and above the median on turnout, logit (ORs)
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VarIables Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote












coNstaNt 0.108+ 0.000592** 0.160 0.108* 27.45 0.382
(0.142) (0.00119) (0.229) (0.0977) (74.54) (0.467)
obserVatIoNs 18,112 12,979 19,603 18,112 12,979 19,603
robust seeform IN PareNtheses
** P<0.01, * P<0.05, + P<0.1
13. table – Income bias, below and above the median, logit (ORs)
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VarIables Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote
subjectIVe staNDarD of lIVING 
(wIthIN couNtry Z-score) 1.006 1.271 1.195 1.160* 1.198 1.102
(0.162) (0.432) (0.156) (0.0846) (0.267) (0.174)
mDmI, below meDIaN 2.174
(6.760)








     * staNDarD of lIVING 0.998
(0.0520)
mDmI, aboVe the meDIaN 0.469
(0.412)








     * staNDarD of lIVING 1.035
(0.0715)
coNstaNt 0.105+ 0.000600** 0.160 0.108* 27.40 0.378
(0.140) (0.00124) (0.230) (0.0971) (74.71) (0.465)
obserVatIoNs 18,112 12,979 19,603 18,112 12,979 19,603
Robust seeform in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1Page • 44
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14. table – welfare state test 1 – logit (ORs)
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VarIables Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote
               
GoVerNmeNt exPeNDIture, 
total, % of GDP, 2007 1.075* 1.067* 1.070* 1.059+ 1.065+ 1.098+ 1.068*
(0.0345) (0.0343) (0.0319) (0.0360) (0.0353) (0.0592) (0.0330)
GINI, eurostat 2009 1.023
(0.0258)
s80/s20, sso 2009 0.981
(0.133)
GINI, earNING, sso 2009 0.986+
(0.00832)
meaN DIstaNce from the meDIaN 0.551
(0.576)






coNstaNt 0.00259** 0.00695** 0.0101** 0.00850* 0.0113* 0.000777* 0.00709**
(0.00507) (0.0126) (0.0164) (0.0174) (0.0208) (0.00276) (0.0120)
obserVatIoNs 20,202 18,964 20,202 18,112 20,202 12,979 19,603
Robust seeform in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1Page • 45
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15. table – welfare state test 2 - logit
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VarIables Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote
               
GoVerNmeNt exPeNDIture,
socIal Prot, % of GDP, 2007 1.104* 1.108* 1.098+ 1.076 1.091+ 3.773** 1.101*
(0.0515) (0.0541) (0.0539) (0.0543) (0.0567) (0.603) (0.0511)
GINI, eurostat 2009 1.009
(0.0247)
s80/s20, sso 2009 0.897
(0.128)
GINI, earNING, sso 2009 0.986+
(0.00733)
meaN DIstaNce from the meDIaN 0.300
(0.252)






coNstaNt 0.0241** 0.0351** 0.0538** 0.0528* 0.0572* 1.51e-10** 0.0385**
(0.0314) (0.0425) (0.0599) (0.0698) (0.0726) (4.13e-10) (0.0444)
obserVatIoNs 20,202 18,964 20,202 18,112 20,202 12,979 19,603
Robust seeform in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1Page • 46
Daniel HornPage • 47
Income inequality and voter turnout 
GInI Discussion Papers
Recent publications of GINI. They can be downloaded from the website www.gini-research.org under the 
subject Papers.
DP 15  Can higher employment levels bring down poverty in the eu?
   Ive Marx, Pieter Vandenbroucke and Gerlinde Verbist
   October 2011
DP 14  Inequality and Anti-globalization Backlash by Political Parties
   Brian Burgoon
   October 2011
DP 13  the Social Stratification of Social risks. Class and responsibility in the ‘new’ welfare State
   Olivier Pintelon, Bea Cantillon, Karel Van den Bosch and Christopher T. Whelan
   September 2011
DP 12  Factor Components of Inequality. A Cross-Country Study
   Cecilia García-Peñalosa and Elsa Orgiazzi
   July 2011
DP 11  An Analysis of Generational equity over recent Decades in the OeCD and uK
   Jonathan Bradshaw and John Holmes
   July 2011
DP 10  whe reaps the Benefits? the Social Distribution of Public Childcare in Sweden and Flanders 
   Wim van Lancker and Joris Ghysels
   June 2011
DP 9  Comparable Indicators of Inequality Across Countries (Position Paper)
   Brian Nolan, Ive Marx and Wiemer Salverda
   March 2011
DP 8  the Ideological and Political roots of American Inequality
   John E. Roemer
   March 2011
DP 7  Income distributions, inequality perceptions and redistributive claims in european societies
   István György Tóth and Tamás Keller
   February 2011
DP 6  Income Inequality and Participation: A Comparison of 24 european Countries + Appendix
   Bram Lancee and Herman van de Werfhorst
   January 2011
DP 5  Household Joblessness and Its Impact on Poverty and Deprivation in europe
   Marloes de Graaf-Zijl
   January 2011
DP 4  Inequality Decompositions - A reconciliation
   Frank A. Cowell and Carlo V. Fiorio
   December 2010
DP 3  A new Dataset of educational Inequality
   Elena Meschi and Francesco Scervini
   December 2010Page • 48
Daniel Horn
DP 2  Are european Social Safety nets tight enough? Coverage and Adequacy of minimum Income Schemes in 14 eu Countries
   Francesco Figari, Manos Matsaganis and Holly Sutherland
   June 2011
DP 1  Distributional Consequences of Labor Demand Adjustments to a Downturn. A model-based Approach with Application to 
   Germany 2008-09
   Olivier Bargain, Herwig Immervoll, Andreas Peichl and Sebastian Siegloch
   September 2010Page • 49
Income inequality and voter turnout 
Information on the GInI project
Aims
The core objective of GINI is to deliver important new answers to questions of great interest to European 
societies: What are the social, cultural and political impacts that increasing inequalities in income, wealth and 
education may have? For the answers, GINI combines an interdisciplinary analysis that draws on economics, 
sociology, political science and health studies, with improved methodologies, uniform measurement, wide 
country coverage, a clear policy dimension and broad dissemination.
Methodologically, GINI aims to:
  ● exploit differences between and within 29 countries in inequality levels and trends for understanding the 
impacts and teasing out implications for policy and institutions,
  ● elaborate on the effects of both individual distributional positions and aggregate inequalities, and
  ● allow for feedback from impacts to inequality in a two-way causality approach.
The project operates in a framework of policy-oriented debate and international comparisons across all EU 
countries (except Cyprus and Malta), the USA, Japan, Canada and Australia.
Inequality Impacts and Analysis
Social impacts of inequality include educational access and achievement, individual employment oppor-
tunities and labour market behaviour, household joblessness, living standards and deprivation, family and 
household formation/breakdown, housing and intergenerational social mobility, individual health and life 
expectancy, and social cohesion versus polarisation. Underlying long-term trends, the economic cycle and 
the current ﬁnancial and economic crisis will be incorporated. Politico-cultural impacts investigated are: Do 
increasing income/educational inequalities widen cultural and political ‘distances’, alienating people from 
politics, globalisation and European integration? Do they affect individuals’ participation and general social 
trust? Is acceptance of inequality and policies of redistribution affected by inequality itself? What effects 
do political systems (coalitions/winner-takes-all) have? Finally, it focuses on costs and beneﬁ ts of policies 
limiting income inequality and its efﬁ ciency for mitigating other inequalities (health, housing, education 
and opportunity), and addresses the question what contributions policy making itself may have made to the 
growth of inequalities.
Support and Activities
The project receives EU research support to the amount of Euro 2.7 million. The work will result in four 
main reports and a ﬁnal report, some 70 discussion papers and 29 country reports. The start of the project 
is 1 February 2010 for a three-year period. Detailed information can be found on the website.
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